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I. INTRODUCTION 
Reciprocal tr,tdc agrecnzctzts such as coutztertrade represent a p rticular kitzd of institntiotzal 
ar ra f lgen lent .  A countcrtradc agreell|ell| has heetz defhtctl as "'an htternathmal comnterei;tl 
operation in the f'ranlcwork of which the seller has to accept itt partial or total settlctttent of his 
deliveries the supply of products conting from the purchasing country" (OECD. 1981 ). In a world 
where most econotnic transactions involve either an actual or an electronic exchange of money 
for products, there would seem to be little place for countertradc. "'tile most venerable fiwnl of 
exchange: a trade of one item for :mother" (tlammond. IgqO, p. 2). h has been estimated, 
however, that at least between 10 and 20e,~ of total world mlde may be characterized asreciprocal 
trade (Hennart and Anderson. 1993, p. 6) and this proportion is still growing (Czinkota et al.. 
1989, p. 494), apparently challenging the economic presumption that barter is less efficient han 
money-for-god,Is transactions. 
Not all countries, however, demand compensation under the same circu,nstances: each type 
ofcountertrade can assume different patterns and is most likely to be motivated by different fac- 
tors, since countertrade includes contracts of very different kinds, from simple barter to offset 
transactions. The term countertrade is therefore used to describe a variety of trade practices that 
can be categorized under two main headings: 
(I) Barter and barwr-(vpeforms (e.g. switch trading and clearing arrangements): One contract. 
no money used and a long-term orientation that involves the swap of one or more products 
for other g~x)ds of similar value. 
{2) Other countvrtradeforms, where money or credit are inwdved, such as: 
• CounterpurHtase: The exporter undertakes the purchase of goods and services from the 
country/company concerned. There are two separate contracts, the principal one normally 
paid for in cash or credit and the second in go~s.  
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• Compensation: Includes trade arrangements that are long-term in nature and consist of 
separate but linked money-for-goods contracts. 
• Bray-Back: A form w'here the exporter transfers technology, and agrees to purchase in return 
some of the plant's output over a given number of years. 
• Off vet: The seller ham to agree to subcontract some of the production to local producers, to 
increase its imports or to transfer technology. 
Contemporary trade theories, however, do not fully explain reciprocal trade, since until 
recently the analysis of the contracts and institutions that govern it have been eglected (Matin 
and Schnitzer. 1995, p. 1049). Most international economists consider countertrade irrational and 
inefficient, or they see it as the result of government-imposed r strictions on trade and foreign 
exchange (see Hennart, 1993). In part this explanatory failure results from misconceptions about 
the different forms of countertrade and the polar question of internalization of transactions and 
market contracting. 
In this paper we shall develop some theoretical elements for analysing the decision path for 
choosing fornls for international trade, by examining alternative contracting forms, and asking 
ourselves why countertrade was preferred to market contracting or internalization, Two impor- 
tant elements in cotmtertrade arrangements, namely flexibility, or the adaptive capability to 
switch from one trade or partner to another, and the tying of the two transactions to create a 
"hostage" (Williatuson, 1983), will bc tile key to our analysis. 
Following this introductory part. and in addition to a theoretical discussion, the paper first 
introduces an analysis of the economic rationale l\lr coutltct'tr,itle, inclutlitlg the asyn|tnetries of
inl'~rttmtion and transaction-cost theory franlewotks. Subsctlttetllly. a conceptu,tl model analyses 
cottntcrtradc asa hybrid form between the market and the hierarchy, and exatnincs the choice of 
cotmterlr:tde asa strategic trading l't~rtn. The last section then provides a suunmary and some con- 
chtding remarks. 
2. I:,CONOMIC RATIONAI,E FOR COUNTERTRADI", 
Alnong tile oldest and most fundanlenlal qtleslions ill econon|ics are th~se regarding tile use 
of  media of exchange iu intern:ttional tr:innactions. Traditional economic theory addresses the 
role and use of a Inediuin of exchange to avt+id trade frictions and proposes, essentially, thai i f  
nloney exists as a nleans of exchange, then barter appears irrational. Therefore, "'ironically, what 
we call "ltllern:ttional Trade' is, in most instances, a cash transaction and "Coulitertrade'. oddly 
enough, is vvll:.tt rade really nle:tns in essence: an exchange of goods without the use of the cur- 
rcncy'" (tlatmuond. 1990, p. 2). 
The analysis of countertradc hlts usually been conducted by means of traditional economic 
theory, albeit based on simplified assutuptions of perfect infl~rnlation*. Economic analysis works 
in an idealized world where economic systctns run st|loothly, and decisions regarding economic 
organization arc based on production and/or distribution costs which can be easily identified. If 
economic IYiction in the form of transaction costs exists, then the explanatory power of traditional 
economic analysis is weakened since real-w'orld situations do not always match economic 
prcdictitms. 
*Theurctical m~J¢ls of tr;id¢ ;,re alway~ ha~..ed on siniplifying a~.,,umptilms. Tile ¢ondilmn of I~:rl'cct infi~rmati~m ix)~.lu- 
luted in tile the~ dl~s m~l emerge sp.mtaneously, as most markets arc impcrt'~ct to begin with (Scimvsky. Igt~)). 
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For such a market o be perfect, most of its members on the buying and selling sides would have 
to compete knowledgeably, and to do so they would have to assemble all the necessary informa- 
tion. Moreover. this assumption ot only simplifies reality but also distorts it. because market- 
relevant knowledge is not randomly distributed among market participants, but in most cases is 
biased in favour of one or the other side. Such a bias has a great impact on market behaviour and 
trade outcomes, and the resulting relationship is a well-known asymmetrical market situation.* 
Although reciprocal trade is widely held to be uncompetitive, some authors regard it more 
favourably. To explain countertrade satisfactorily, the economic motivation for this preference 
needs to be revealed. An examination of the trading parties" incentives for bypassing money 
mediation suggests that. as the traditional case against barter was presented in the context of a 
closed economy, the extension of the argument to international trade implies that all trading part- 
ners should have equal access to the media of exchange and information. If this is not so. the 
theoretical case against barter does not hold up. and we are back to the basic tenet hat some alter- 
native form of reciprocal trade will arise. As Stigler (1969. p. 39) pointed out "the case for 
reciprocity arises when prices cannot be freely varied to meet supply and demand conditions. 
Here reciprocity restores flexibility of prices". 
Reciprocal trade arrangements are often seen as a means of solving foreign exchange short- 
ages when countries~customers have difficulty in obtaining trade credits, and most explanations 
of countertrade suggested in the descriptive literature ascribe the increasing importance of reci- 
procal trade to the high indebtedness of countries. Hennart ( 1989. pp. 13 I - I  32) has shown, how- 
ever. that this is not generally true. and has in arly case limited explanatory power. Perhaps only 
sinlple barter and barter-like contracts under specific tend;lions have this property, since they 
luay not involve cash transactions of any kind (Banks. 1¢)83). Other countcrtrade ft)rnlS, such as 
conlpensation, counterpurchase and buy-back, which represent nlorc than half of all countertrade 
transactions, tit) not help in solving a country's hortage of hard currency, and ;ire more likely to 
be motivated by additional l~lctors.'l" 
l~nlpirical results (|lenllart. 1990; Caves and Marin, 1992; ||¢nnart and Anderson. 1993) 
suggest hat countcrtrade occurs in situations where the superiority of market-mediated transac- 
lions is not well established, either because of asynlnlctric infornlation or imperfect (distorted) 
competition. For both parties to countertradc there must therel'orc bc compatible economic incen- 
tives to forego ordinary market alternatives. [n the absence of these factors, countertrade would 
perhaps be replaced by money-mediated transactions in the form of commodity trade, forward 
sales, foreign direct investtnent (FDI) and other fornls of internalization. 
hi many (regulated and developing ) econoinies, nlarkct imperfections are the norln and 
business kills are often scarce, while It)reign exporters face nlany restrictions and a lack of infor- 
nlalion on the business environtnent and the quality of goods. We will see that under these 
circumstances countertrade may lead to transactions that would otherwise not occur. Studies by 
Hennart (1989) and I-lcnnart and Anderson (1993). which also focus on transaction costs as a 
rationale for CT, test the hypothesis that CT is a second-best alternative to direct foreign invest- 
luent by h)oking at country data. They find supporting evidence that CT is more frequently used 
by countries which restrict FDI. Their tests are based on 39 and 84 observations respectively. 
*For a more dclaih:d -',pproaeh (L) the problcm.~ derived from quality uncertainty and the .-,.,,ymmclric information of buy- 
er~, and sellers. ,~: Akt:rlof (1970). 
"i'Non-price situation.~, like: countcrtradc, can thcrcfor~ assume m~my form~, and consist in elfeting a great varicly of 
linked Irun~¢lions. including ~:uuranlics and warranties thal combine lhc advantages of  added information at a lower 
in~,uranc~ C[)sl. 
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Mirus and Yeung (1986) used transaction-cost theories in an attempt to explain reciprocal 
trade. Defining eountertrade an a "'double coincidence of wants". "'an incentive contract-output 
with quality dimension" and "'a differentiated product used as an input by the technology sup- 
plier", they showed that the lack of foreign exchange wax. at best, a partial and somewhat super- 
ficial explanation. The authors concluded that these arrangements did not necessarily imperfec- 
tions, and resorting to countertrade may be a reflection of the high transaction and search costs 
faced by a trader when trying to market goods. 
Further friction arises when goods are of uncertain quality, and when agents have different 
information about this quality. In this case some agents will make trade contingent on some infor- 
mation which they cannot observe. This creates an incentive problem, which in turn makes 
implicit credit arrangements difficult without a medium of exchange. 
Murrell (1982) used market signalling theory to show that eountertrade could solve problems 
that arose when the quality of foreign goods was unknown. He concluded that countertrade prac- 
tices were particularly useful when a country has a poor reputation for quality, and when the infor- 
mation about the specific quality of products, which was important to the buyer, could not be 
obtained irectly (here intermediatc rading companies play a leading role). Predictions were sup- 
ported by empirical tests based on data from more than 400 contracts. 
There are two large areas of theoretical uncertainty surrounding countertrade and other recip- 
rocal trade arrangements which this article will explore. The first in to account for the existence 
and use of countertrade itsan intermediate (hybrid) arrangement. The contemporary theory of the 
firm emphasizes the cross-subslitutibility of firms and markets as organizational modalities, but 
it does not easily explain termetli:tlc organizations.* The second major area of inqniry pursued 
here is an account of how ct)untertr:ttle agreemenls  maintain their economic rents and stability. 
given the absence of legal-institutional SUl~ports. 
3. T l lF  INSTITtJTI()NAI. FRAMi:.WOI~,K 
While the modern theory of tlze firm has addressed the dcternzh)ants of the internalization of 
economic transactions, a salisfactory cxpl:mation of partial interl)alization rein:fins elusive. A 
possible xplanation may be "the diflicnlties one typic:ally finds in confronting ideal types such 
as markets and hierarchies with the empirical richness of the wide variety of means for organiz- 
ing transactions" (Collin and Larsson, 1993, p. 7). Nevertheless, since countertrade arrangements 
should not become a ealah)gue of imperfect ccnnpetition solutions in international finance and 
trading systems, the aim of this article is to approach the economic organization of countertrade 
I'rom a comparative institutional point of view, showing tha! it is possible to construct and use a
third (hybrid) institution:d form that is congruent with tran.saction-cost theory, while conserving 
efficiency gains generated by these specific arrangements. 
Since the time of Williamson's (1975) original fornmlation, many criticism have ben levelled 
at the transaction-cost approaeh.t The recognition tbat markets and hierarchies by no means con- 
stitute a mutually exhaustive ,set of institutional fl)rms for governing transactions has generated 
"numerous attempts to develop alternative contracting fi~rms'" (Collin and Larsson, 1993, p. 5). 
*Hcnnart (|~93) ha.,, ncvcrlhelcs~ argued t|zat the I~  i~)lc'~, t/rm~, and market c(mlracting, in fact de~cribe xtreme and 
qtfitc rare cases. '~,'ilh n)o,~l t)rganilatitm,, f:dling St+lltc~,hcre l'~twc+t|. 
"i'Tranxactmn-cosl -'m:,lysis is by no means the only explanathm l'(w the existence of firms. EMcicncy reasons may 
lead to integration, permitting the re:,li/:.athm of  economics of  scale or ,,col-,c. Firm.,, m:,y also bc established to exert 
n)onol~Jly l~V,'cr (Tiroh.'. 19~8~. 
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Williamson (1991), introduced the hybrid as an intermediate form between the market and the 
hierarchy, which involves regulation, franchising and various form  of long-term contracting. 
including reciprocal trading. 
Unified-governance and market-governance ar thus poles on the organizational continuum 
proposed by the transaction-cost theories, but other organizational hybrids have also been envis- 
aged as middle-points on this continuum t Hennart. 19931 or as a third institutional form, with 
intermediate characteristics between the market and the hierarchy I Larsson, 1993). Discreet 
transactions would then be located at one extreme, while highly centralized hierarchical transac- 
tions would be at the other, and hybrid transactions (reciprocal tr de and other forms of non- 
standard contracting) would be located between them.* 
Although many hypothetical forms of organization "'never arise or quickly die out, because 
they combine inconsistent features" (Williamson, 1991, p. 271), complex arrangements such as 
joint ventures or countertrade agreements can be explained by invoking imperfect competition. 
We suggest here that countertrade is not novel, and by no means a mixed case. but that it is a dis- 
tinct type of institutional rrangement. If this is so. then following Williamson's prescription that 
organizational forms are determined by a comparison of alternative institutional arrangements. 
we can say that the decision regarding the organizational form for coordinating international trade 
involves comparing at least three forms: (i) Market-contracting: (ii) hierarchy and (iii) interme- 
diate forms (such as counterlrade). 
In Williamson's perspective, it is this efficiency criterion - -  the minimization t)l" transaction 
costs ~ which explains the emergence of a specific governance structure. Transaction-cost 
analysis entails an assessment of the comparative costs of planning, adapting and monitoring the 
completion of the task under altern,'ttive governance structures. This approach can be extended 
in order to include hybrid t'orn,s, but the basic postuhtte r mains t*nchanged: the governance 
structure that finally emerges is the one that ininin)izes transaction costs. 
Transaction-cost theory has bccn applied tt) many different btlsincss areas, and in this context 
appears particularly relevant o the study of the role of countcrtr:tde and other complex trading 
forms in the international business arena, since producers are likely to bc concerned about the 
extent of the difficulties and costs inw)lved in selecting, negotiating, managing and controlling 
intermediaries in servicing foreign markets, which may bc remote and complex (high uncer- 
tainty) and which require specialized knowledge and investments (high asset specificity). 
Generally. the main determinant taken into account is asset-specificity ( he level of uncertainty 
is assumed in some way). Consequently, agreements are supposed to minimize transaction costs 
when the degree of asset-specificity s h)cated at an intermediary level. The underlying argument 
is that countertrade agreements combine some of the advantages of the market (high-powered 
incentives and less bureaucratic costs than hierarchy, but to a lesser degree than the market 
alternative) and the one hand. and some of the advantages of hierarchy (in terms of control 
instruments, reducing opportunism and information flows) on the other. This combination of 
advantages would be especially appropriate when the asset-specificity is not too high. 
Under certain circumstances producers may think that relying on exports could be advanta- 
geous in the classical sense (production costs), but prohibitive in terms o1" transaction costs. In 
Williamson's terms, they might decide to use some kind of reciprocal trade agreement, rather 
*In his earlier work, William~,on argued that hybrids could be expected to be rather rare. re~,umbling the distribution of 
real-world organizati~)ns on the continuum of two peak~, divided by a deep. broad valley. Later William,.,on revi~d hi.,, 
thinking, acknowledging [hal the population cff complex economic organizations was far grealer than he' had earlier 
thought, and that organizational forms were much more evenly distributed. 
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than internalizing the export function or going to the market (i.e. through intermediaries or trad- 
ing companies). 
One way to deter this is to expand the contracting relationship from unilateral to bilateral 
exchange. Reciprocal trading, especially when it involves product exchanges, creates credible 
commitments hat are signalled without exposing assets. Both parties understand that the trans- 
action will be continued only if reciprocity is observed. Reciprocity can therefore generate ben- 
efits for the governance structure (Williamson. 1983). 
Countertrade agreements have certain features reminiscent of markets, in that the two partic- 
ipating firms continue to conduct discrete xchanges with each other, while maintaining formally 
independent roles. Nevertheless. certain organization-like f atures are introduced as well: con- 
tractual limits are placed on the terms of the exchange, and overall imitations are set to govern 
activity with potentially competing firms. Within their areas of respective unilateral authority. 
the firms utilize their existing internal hierarchies to coordinate performance. A hybrid structure 
can be expected, when these conditions obtain. 
Nevertheless. one importance source of sustainable rents is "'the ability of firms to reduce the 
costs they experience in organizing both internal and external transactions below those of their 
rivals" (Hennart. 1994. p. 193) and to this end. costs are minimized when the firm chooses the 
organizing mode that is most efficient for a given transaction. The n|inimization of transaction 
costs is thercfl~re a criterion of efficiency which explains the emergence of specific governance 
structures, i.e. either market or hierarchy, although this approach may be extended to include 
intermediate hybrid fi~rms. The argument is thus that CT agreements offer prospective advan- 
tages over trnilateral trade, if tire resulting exposure of tra,lsaction-specific assets effects a cred- 
ible conmlitnlelrt arrlolrg tire partners. If such is tile case. we stlggcst that countertrz,de can reduce 
t r : lnsact ion or)Ms. 
When strong uncerlainty c,~exists with ;.t high degree ofassct-specil'icity, however, it is impos- 
sible to specify ex-antc the whtdc set of ctmtingclrt clauses required for executing the the 
contn, ct (bounded rationality hypothesis). Thus c()nlracts ;ire necessarily incomplete. This in turn 
generates problems of enl'~)rcement, due tt) (~pportt, nistu ;,,nong tile agents. C(mSetlt,Cnlly long- 
term incomplete ctmtracting is generally characterized by frequent misnndersta,ldings and 
conflicts which may lead It) delays, breaktl~)wns or other inalfuxlctions. There are two main 
situations in which transaction costs are likely to be high: 
• When there is signil]cant infornmtion asymmetry between tile parties" 
• When the market is narrow because of scale econ~)mies, transportation costs or the need to 
make transactiem-specil'ic nvestments. 
According to Larsson ( 1993, p. 99) market contracting involves costs primarily for getting the 
products to and from the market. Under conditions of hierarchical coordination, on the other 
hand, such marketing and purchasing costs would be redticed to mere transportation costs, 
although there would be administrative xpenses m addition to the internalization costs that are 
usually neglected in transaction-cost analysis. In the case of countertrade, however, the main 
costs are related to the process of negotiation, and to achieving an agreement on a joint structure, 
as we shall see below. 
Two observations reinf~rce the idea that negotiation costs are important in the case of coun- 
terlrade (barter) agreements. Firstly, agreements generally take the form of long-term incomplete 
contracts, which are precisely tho.~e ,suffering from strategic bargaining, conflicts and other mal- 
functions, according to Williamson. Exhaustive contracting is too flexible and generally leads to 
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Institutional Market Countertrade Hierarchy 
Division of adjustment Self-adjustment Joint adjustment Impo~d adjustment 
Adjustment reference Price Contractual agreements Authoritative orders 
Resulting from... Supply and demand Negotiation Planning 
Primary relative costs Marketing and purchasing Searching and negotiation Administration Internalization 
Source: Adapted from Larsson. R. ( 1993. p. 99). 
failure. Secondly, if we admit that the length of negotiations represents an acceptable 
approximation f the e.r-ante costs, then it must be recognized that the latter are especially high: 
the duration of the negotiations often exceeds one year.* 
Within countertrade transactions, however, free exchange is at least partly abandoned (per- 
haps due to concern about opportunism), but so too is total internalization. Rather, the two firms 
remain independent in their larger missions, but operate a specific pooling of assets through a 
joint governance structure and share their claim to the resulting residual. For transaction-cost 
theory the greater challenge is not to show which markets fail and why. but to show why a mix 
or intermediate stnlctnre (such as countertrade) may do more to minimize transaction costs 
compared to the alternative forms. 
4. THE MINIMIZATION OF TRANSACTION COSTS 
Ifcountertrade dtr:s not appear tt) mitfimiz¢ transaction costs, i.e. it" it is less eMcient than hier- 
archy or nmrket ct)nlracting, why dt) firms g() in for it? what is the value of such agreements? 
HOW. in some instances, tit) they compensale for higher transaction costs? The answer is 
connected with the v:due of having a "hostage" in markets under asymmetric information and 
possessing the dynanlic elements of countertrade agreements, as a way of attaining future 
IYccdom of choice in unpredict:lblc or changing environments. 
Most failures to expl:,in countertrade may result from a misconception about the forms it may 
take. Hennart (1980. p. 148), for instance, argued that the various forms of CT are aggregated 
both in the()retical discussion and in empirical work. ahhot, gh in fact each one deserves an 
explanation on it own merits. Countertrade agreements include transactions of very different 
kinds, some of them with barter-like characteristics su h as (i) simple barter, switch trading and 
clearing arrangements, which may be a response to fi)reign exchange shortages or asymmetric 
information problems, while (ii) other countertradc forms (e.g. buy-back, counterpurchase and 
compensation), can be regarded under certain circumstances a a ration:d response to market 
imperfections - - as a second-best option in a second-best world economy. 
Although some specific ex-antc transacti(m costs may be high (searching, negotiating), the ex- 
post (bonding) effects and the consequences of executing the contract are of chief interest here. 
The problem in international trade is often that the quality of the goods is either not observed by 
an outsider, or can only be verified at considerable cost. so that it cannot be specified unambigu- 
ously in a contract. The CT contract is designed in such a way that goods serve as deal-specific 
*The obscr~,.ations come from an cxaminati(~n of  .~veral case studies of complex trade agreements by Llerena et uL 
(1991). 
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collateral, and their value depends of the quality decision. Countertrade can provide an effi- 
ciency-enhancing way of dealing with problems of moral hazard in international trade, since the 
tying together of two transactions creates a"'hostage" (Williamson. 1983 ) which may deter cheat- 
ing on quality or defaulting on the payment of the original export.* 
Commitment to the exchange is signalled more definitely by the willingness of the parties to 
accept reciprocal goods transactions. Reciprocity can serve to qualize the exposure of the par- 
ties. thereby reducing the incentive of one party to defect from the exchange, leaving the other to 
redeploy specialized assets a  greatly reduced alternative value. Defection hazards are thereby 
reduced, giving the partner an incentive to fulfil its financial obligations.+ Countertrade creates 
a double moral-hazard situation, and is more likely to provide an efficient institution, the higher 
the gains from consecutive trades (Williamson. 1983). 
Williamson views the firm as one of a set of possible institutional relationships structured in 
order to reduce the hazards of idiosyncratic bargaining that inevitably arise in various "small 
number" circumstances, such as asset-specificity and long-term contracts. While both bounded 
rationality and opportunism present difficulties, they do not necessarily lead to market failures. 
since markets represent "'large number" conditions: there are many potential buyers and sellers 
of goods which are interchangeable, the market signals the appropriate price. "Small number" 
conditions are much more hazardous. Where the pool of potential transactors is limited, one party 
can gain the advantage. Where the exchanged assets are no longer obtainable from multiple 
sources, but are unique, tension can be expected between buyers and sellers. If the seller has no 
alternative customer fi,r the product, he may be constrained to accept a price from the buyer which 
is not adcquatcly cotnpcnsated. Similarly. the purchaser may be dependent on the supplier of a 
unique or scarce asset, and significant costs and delays may be incurred if the desired good is to 
bc obtained from an altcrn:ttivc supplicr. Similar dynamics of mutual dependency can be 
observed in long-term countertrade r lationships. 
Another assumption is ixnportant here, namely opportunism. If there is no opportunism, good 
laith and mutual adjustment can bc used for coordination purposes, and safeguards will be super- 
fluotts under these circumstances. Not all situations :rod individuals, however, are opportunistic 
to the s:tmc degree, "'some individuals are opp~,rtunistic and [...I differential trustworthiness is 
rarely transparent ex-a,te. As :t consequence, ex-ante screening efforts are made and ex-post sale- 
guards are created'" (Williamson, 1985 p. 64):~.. 
From the production point of view, the idea of an organization without boundaries implies the 
coordination of relations with suppliers and customers by assuming an integrated view of the sys- 
tenn. The development of institutional trade agreements, such as countertrade, will thus help to 
reduce the risk of opportunism. Under these circumstances, buy-back, counterpurchase and other 
compensation agrcements can be seen as attempts to reduce transaction costs by providing what 
amounts to a bond or  hostage. 
In CT costs are usually highly specific to the tr:msaction, and have two attributes: they are 
incurred in advance of the contemplated xchange, and their value in alternative uses or by alter- 
native users is greatly reduced (Klein et al.. 1990 used the term "'appropriable quasi-rent'" to 
*The crucial a.ss, umptitm underlying the analysis presented in this article is that. as assets become more specific and 
appropriable, quasi-rents are created (thus increasing the t'x)ssiblc gains from opl~)rtunistic behaviour), the costs ()f mar- 
ket ctmtracting will gener;dly increase more than the costs of ccmntertrading. 
1""Reputation theory" suggests that a country, will n()t repudiate its debt. if it would otherwise risk its future participation 
in the internatit)nal trade and financial markets. 
:~Quoted by No()rderhaven ( 1995. p, .$7). 
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describe this condition). Reciprocity in these circumstances is thus a device whereby the conti- 
nuity of a specific trading relation is promoted, white also reducing risk. In the absence of a 
"hostage" or some other assurance that the other party will not defect, the sale may never mate- 
rialize. Thus, barter may be an "inefficient" form of trade, not because of the absence of a "'dou- 
ble coincidence of wants" but as a result of asymmetric nformation and market inefficiencies. 
Although we explore one particular cost of using the market system - -  namely the possibil- 
ity of postcontractual opportunistic behaviour m another key dimension in this context is asset 
specificity, which refers to "the dependence reated through transaction-specific investments. It 
expresses the amount of value involved in the exchange as such. This value arises from the par- 
ties having made investments in the exchange, and from the cost that would be incurred through 
ending the relation and choosing another exchange party. The second dimension is uncertainty. 
inherent in situations in which bounded rationality makes humans incapable of predicting the 
future. The third dimension is frequency, referring to how often the transaction occurs'" (Collin 
and Larsson. 1993, p. 4). 
At this stage we are able to analyse the limitations of transaction-cost explanations in the case 
of countertrade agreements. Countertrade seems to suffer high transaction costs, partly because 
of its neglect of the flexibility aspects. The nature of the flexibility considered will be crucial to 
our analysis. Indeed. in economic theory it is usually considered that flexibility is a market char- 
acteristic: market mechanisms insure a certain kind of flexibility (through price and/or quantity 
adjustments), mainly in terms of resource allocation. Hierarchies, on the contrary, are supposed 
to be "'rigid". Rigidities are the result of bureaucratization and arc entralized ecision processes, 
and linked to the size and complexity of the hierarchy. 
Flexibility is an ubiquitous and rather ambiguous concept. The kind of flexibility we are talk- 
ing about must be clearly distinguished from the alhvcative mechanistic adjustment properties 
genendly attributed to market ransactions. We do not argue that countertrade agreements arc 
more flexible than market ransactions, but that they have some of the properties of market adjust- 
mont, like the ability to change partners or dissolve the relationship in case of opportunistic 
bchaviour.* 
The transaction-costs approach is essentially a comparatively static one: the institutional 
analysis assumes instantaneous optin|ization of the institutional form according to a specified set 
of determinants ~ for instance, the degree of asset-specificity ~ and the process of shifting from 
one particular form to another is not analysed. In this context ahybrid arrangement permits amore 
appropriate approach to organizational termttives: barter and barter-like agreements may then 
appear as intermediate h~rms, more flexible than hierarchies but less th;m markets. 
Other countertrade arrangements can instead be used as devices for reducing the high 
transaction costs, which affect three types of international transactions in particular, namely the 
purchase of poorly protected technology, the sale of intermediate products under small-number 
conditions, and the purchase of marketing services when the distributor has to make up-front 
transaction-specific nvestments in countries with restrictions on incoming FDI. 
A firm motivated by a desire to integrate horizontally or vertically, or to benefit from firm- 
specific advantages, would want to put its capital and technology to use in production abroad. 
However. due to high proprietary costs and political constraints it may be prevented from 
*Opportunistic behaviour has been identified and discussed in modem anal)~is of the organization of economic 
activity. Williamson (1975). for example, has referred to the effects on the contracting process of" "ex-poxt small 
numbers opportunism". 
scribe is ndition). ciprocity ese ireumstances us vice ereby e nti-
ity ecific trading lation romoted. ite also ducing l" e bsence
ostage" orne ther ssurance at e ther party l t efecto e le ay ver ate-
lize. s. rter ay n ef icient" rm rade. t cause e bsence dou-
l incidence nts" t s sult symmetric f rmation d arket f iciencies.
ough xplore e rticular cost ing e arket stem mely e ssibil-
stcontractual portunistic haviour - other y i ension í is ntext sset
ecificity. ich fers e pendence eated rough ransaction-specific nvestm nts. l
xpresses e ount lue olved e xchange s ch. i lue rises m e r-
i s ving ade estments e xchange. d m e st at uld ur ed rough
ding e lation d oosing other xchange rty. cond i ension certaínty.
erent ítuations ich unded tionality akes ans apable redicting e
ture. ird i ension quency. fer ing w ten e ransaction curs" lli
nd sson. 93. . ).
is tage re ble nalyse e itations ransaction-cost xplanations e se
untert ade gre ments. ntert ade ems f er i h ransaction sts. partly cause
s glect e xibility spects. ture e xibility nsidered íll e ucial
r nalysis. l eed. conomic eory ually nsidered at xibility arket ar-
cteristíc: arket echanisms ure rtain d xíbility hrough rice d/or antity
djustments). ainly rms source llocation. rarchies. e ntrary. re pposed
e rigid". i ities re e sult reaucratizatíon nd are ntralized d cision rocesses.
nd I ed e i c d plexity I e i rarchy.
xibility n iquitous d ther biguous OI1l:ept. d xibility re lk-
bout ust e 1 arly i tínguished om I e ullocative echanislic adjustment properties
enerully ltribuled arket ransaclions. do t rgue at untert ade gre rnenls re
ore xible an arket ransactions. t at ey uye orne 01' e roperties 01' urkel djust-
ent. e bility ange rtners issolve e clationship se 01' porlunistic
haviour.*
ransaction-costs pproach cssentially rnparalively tatic one: e titutional
nalysis ssumes tantaneous timizution 01' e titutional ml ccording ecilied t
01' terlllinants - r stam:e. I e gre 01' sset-specilicily - nd lhe rocess 01' ifting om
e rticular rm l other t nalysed. l is ntext brid rrangement crmils ore
ppropri~te pproach rganizational lternatives: rter d baner-like gre rnents ay en
ppear s lermediale forms. ore xible an i rarchies l ss an urkets.
l er untert ade rrangemcnts n stead e sed s vices r ducing e i h
ransaction sts. ich IT ct re pes 01' ternational ransactions nicular. mely e
rchase orly rotected ehnology, e le termedíale roducts der all-number
nditions. nd e rchasc arketing rvices en e islribulOr s 10 ake -front
ransaction-specilic estmenls untries h strictions coming
t olivated y sire tegrate rizontally rtically, 10 nctit om t -
ecitic dvantages. uld nt t s ¡¡ ital ano l chnology se roduclion broad.
ever, e i h roprietary sts d litical nstraints l ay e rcvenled om
· ppor!unislic bchaviour s cn cnlilicd d discus cd em analysis u l e urgani/.aliun u c unomic
clivily. son 75). r c a plc. s fcr cd l I e c:ffcels I e cuntracling proccss u ·po." al
bers op or!unism".
112 D. CAMINO and C. CARDONE 
assuming ownership. In this situation the imperfections in the markets for capital and technology 
are not overcome by internalization, which leads to a divergence between the economic interests 
of the user and supplier of capital and technology. This problem is aggravated by the information 
asymmetry between the user and the supplier, and by the absence of future commodity markets 
in many countries and goods. 
The main alternative to vertical integration as a solution to the general problem of oppor- 
tunistic behaviour is some form of economically enforceable ong-term contract, such as a coun- 
tertrade agreement. Clearly a short-term (i.e. one transaction, on-repeat spot sale) contract will 
not solve the problem (Klein et al., 1990). The relevant question then concerns when the vertical 
integration, the market contracting or the countertrade transactions will occur. We will attempt 
to make a distinction between a non-price long-term contract like countertrade, and ownership, 
or market contracting. 
Non-price long-term contracts used as an alternative to market contracting or vertical 
integration can be assumed to assume one of two forms: (i) an explicitly stated contractual 
guarantee l gally enforced by the government orsome other outside institution: or (ii) an implicit 
contractual guarantee nforced by the market mechanism of withdrawing future business is 
opportunistic behaviour occurs. 
Explicit long-term contracts can in principle solve opportunistic problems but, as we 
have already suggested, the solutions are very costly. Contractual provisions specifying 
compulsory arbitration or more directly imposing costs on the opportunistic party (for example, 
via bonding) are alternatives often employed to cut down on litigation costs and to create 
flexibility without specifying every possible contingency and quality dimension of the 
transaction. 
Such countertradc agreements thus arise as a rational economic solution to market imperfec- 
tions caused by high ownership costs (or ownership constraints) and information asymmetry. 
This means that most of these alternative institutional forms for countertrade can be ascribed 
features which lie between those of the market and those of the hierarchy. Buy-back, for instance, 
involves a class of international transaction that can be viewed as the vertical or horizontal 
integration of economic activities while retaining separate ownership, whereas offset has been 
used in government-related contracts (fighter aircraft, military supplies, etc.) largely in response 
to political factors. 
The analysis has two important implications: first, since a significant percentage of counter- 
trade transactions have little to do with foreign exchange shortages, changes in the debt situation 
of less-developed countries should have only a moderate impact on the development of counter- 
trade. Second, the future of counterpurchase, compensation a d buy-back depends ion restric- 
tions on FD1 on the part of the host countries. 
Since buy-back, compensation a d counterpurchase agreements probably make up more than 
half of all countertrade transactions, the countertrade intensity with a country should be 
correlated with the degree to which it restricts incoming FDI. The empirical evidence generally 
confirms these observations (Hennart, 1989, p. 147). On this point the analysis links countertrade 
to existing theories of FDI. 
Countertrade can also be seen as a device for reducing the cost of arranging for the interna- 
tional marketing of products. There is clear evidence that countries imposing counterpurchase 
requirements doso in order to diversify their exports. There are two ways in which manufactur- 
ing and overseas distributions can be integrated. Manufacturers in the home market can establish 
sales subsidiaries overseas, or firms with developed distribution systems in the home market can 
establish production facilities in foreign countries. 
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Distribution services are also subject to market failure. First, there is often a small number of 
potential suppliers of distribution services. Second, there is substantial up-front investment to be 
made in developing distribution structures, which gives rise to a specific asset. Finally. distribu- 
tors have local knowledge (about their territories), on which it is difficult to set as price. 
In addition, producers may feel uncomfortable with export partners who have access to 
sources of information unavailable to them selves (asymmetric information), who do not 
necessarily enjoy the best reputation (perhaps due to past opportunism), or who are operating in 
a business environment where reliance on export intermediaries may not have been traditionally 
encouraged, in general, and particularly not by government (atmosphere). 
In order to explain the nature of the agreements a stable strategies, we use the notion of orga- 
nizational flexibility, based on the activation of learning activities between the countertrade 
partners, which the transaction-costs explanations failed to consider. Such agreements are thus 
a response related to the value of the dynamic elements of countertrade agreements, asa means 
of learning and enhancing one's future freedom of choice in unpredictable or changing 
environments. Countertrade then. can be considered as a routine process for creating complex 
agreements, constituting a particular kind of institutional trading form. 
Even if reciprocal trade agreements suffer high ex-ante transaction costs due to the lengthy 
negotiations, the traditional approach to CT - -  because of its neglect of the dynamic aspects a
is unable to explain the positive value of such agreements. This line of thought hus suggests that 
barter and barter-like trading agreements will be useful in situations where due to information 
asymmetry, high transaction costs would otherwise prevent international trade from taking place: 
other countertradc forms such as buy-back, compensation and counterpurchase, on the other 
hand, will be used to avoid restrictions on exports and to deal with the problem of moral hazard 
when host countries have r strictions on FDI. 
in conclusion, thee seems to be evidence that although the negotiation costs of countertrade 
agreements are often high. such complex contracts may - -  in terms of efficiency gains and orga- 
nizational tlexibility, and in the absence of equity links - -  a second-best answer to the problems 
of marketing and investing in foreign markets. The analysis of countertrade has thus progressed 
from a simple situation of double coincidence of wants, to a double coincidence of information 
scarcity. It is not then necessarily an inefficient form of trade, nor is it inevitably a reflection of 
a shortage of tbreign exchange; countertrade is simply a substitute for other more standard forms 
of market rade or internalization. 
5. THE CHOICE OF STRATEGIC TRADING FORM 
Countertrade arrangements represent only one of the options available to the exporter for 
market entry or the maintenance of market shares. There are other alternatives such as licensing, 
plant delivery, co-production, subcontracting, joint-venture, joint tendering and bilateral or 
tripartite governance forms (see Buckley and Casson, 1988 or Hennart, 1988). China is an 
obvious example, where buy-back agreements have recently been declining with the enactment 
of joint-venture regulations. Some countertrade forms can then be seen as a hybrid of joint 
venture, franchising, vertical integration and FDI under political and ownership constraints. 
The organizational decision to establish a countertrade transaction can be more usefully 
envisaged as a set of sub-decisions, including (i) where to locate various stages of production~ 
(ii) where to locate the boundary between the firm and the exterior; and (iii) whether the 
organizational boundary should be hard (market-contracting) or soft (internalization). For a host 
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of environmental nd institutional reasons, these boundaries often correspond to national market 
frontiers in countertrade arrangements. 
The decision as to where to locate specific production phases is dictated by locational 
advantages.* Advantage may be viewed in terms of returns on productive assets. Assets - -  be 
they plant, labour, or distribution channels - -  which are located in economies characterized by 
comparative advantage, are more favorably priced. 
Complex production may involve distributing production phases over different national 
territories (that is, by using productive assets located in different national territories). This 
decision corresponds to identifying the national economy which has a comparative advantage 
during a particular production phase. Alternatively this may be thought of as commanding 
(through "transactions") the optional set of immobile productive assets. Multinational companies 
may be particularly adept at identifying which national economy has a comparative advantage in 
a particular stage of production. 
Given that the optional organizational structure frequently requires a transnational distribu- 
tion of production, the analysis then proceeds to the internalization/market d cision. According 
to Williamson. this involves a comparative analysis of institutional forms, with internalization 
being favoured where market ransaction costs are relatively high (or equivalent, where markets 
fifil). Similarly, given a transnational distribution of production, internalization in the form of 
FDI, is preferred where the firms possess firm-specific advantages which they prefer not to alien- 
ate, and countertrade is used when these advantages are shared. 
The main aspect o emphasize is the reconfiguration of organizational boundaries. The spread 
of subcontracting and other fornls of interfirm agreements - -  from joint ventures to strategic 
alliances - -  hits developed network form of organization its a third institutional fonu, somewhere 
half-way between vertical integration and market contracting. A hybrid form of governance is
likely to arise, its such a development may be the final outcome of a long process tarted from the 
polar premises of make-or-buy decisions (Williamson. 1975). 
Hybrid governance, with safeguards, corresponds to bilateral or trilateral governance its 
described by Williamson (1985, 1991). "'These relationships are characterized by high levels of 
asset specificity and mutual adaptation and [ . . .  ] ciln take the I'ornl of complex contracts, speci- 
lying arrangements for price and quantity adjustments . . .'" (N(~)rderhaven, 1995. p. 45). 
International countertrade agreements, we believe, are organizational hybrids, intermediate 
points on the continuum described by Williamson (I 991) ;rod others, between markets and com- 
plete integration (the unitary firm). The organizational decision is more complex than deciding 
whether a firm purchases a pn)ductive asset (internalization), or its output (market). We describe 
this more complex decision as an "access decision", in which internalization is only one of a 
larger set of possibilities. 
There are situations in which CT alternatives may be beneficial to partners, because conomies 
can be realized. Let us take the example of a producer of textile machinery who exports to a coun- 
try like China. If the exporter firm agrees to take payment in the form of textile products (buy- 
back), it may reduce the risk of variability in product quality and delivery schedules (as a result 
of its own technology and management), and the Chinese may perceive a lower risk of product 
*In his "'eclectic" approach, Dunning (1988) translates the |lcckshcr-Ohlin notion of comparative advantage, which is 
an attribute of a national economy, into"'h~:ation:d a vantage". Locational advantage is not directly attached to a terri- 
tory, but rather to certain pnv, luctive assets fixed to thatlerritory. The immobility of productive assets (such as lal'~mr) 
underli,,:s this notion of Iocational dvantage. 
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Internation',d Trade Commitments 
Access Spot (Cash/Credit/no m ney) Continuous (Contracts) 
Exclusive Barter and barter-type forms Internalization 
Shared Market Other countertrade forms 
Source: Adapted from Atik, J. (1993). 
failure in buying the machinery, since the selling firm will not be "paid" unless the machinery 
performs to specifications (Rugman and Hodgetts. 1995. p. 168). 
Assume. however, that the home country restricts incoming FDI. and is either unable or 
unwilling to set up marketing networks abroad. Compensation and counterpurchase can serve as 
the next best route to effective marketing. By telling suppliers that they will import only if the 
supplier takes back and markets their products, countertraders can force suppliers to undertake 
marketing investments which they would not otherwise have done. The exporter who is forced 
to take back the countertrading country's products can be expected to make a greater commit- 
ment to nmrketing the goods, because failure to do so would jeopardize his future sales. This 
is a way of substituting fi~r hierarchical coordination, when the political desire for national 
sovereignty pushes towards inflows of FDI. 
As we have suggested above, each viable form of governance - - market, hybrid forms such 
as countcrtrade, hierarchy - -  is defined by a series of attributes that bear supporting relations. 
Among the intermediate forms, countertradc m:ty be a superior structure when it comes to 
exploiting special tr:tding situations, where (i) the prospect of ntarkct failure ntakes spot- 
contracting unreliable; (ii) access to assets can be viably shared witht)ut general diffttsion; but 
where (iii) greater attention must be paid to prc,,;crving economic rents (Atik. 1993). 
A firm mttst obtain access to all the necessary traded assets: "'transactitms'" are the xchanges 
by which such access is obtained.* The access decision includes (i) whether ecourse to the asset 
is on a spot (market-cash/credit or barter-no ,noncy) or a continuous (contracting) basis, and 
fttrther, whether (ii) such access is to be exclusive or shared. 
Note that the spot/continuous access decision fi~llows Williamson's "fundamental transfor- 
ntation": where markets function well, spot access is adequate; where markets fail (small 
ntnnbers) continuous use is preferred in order to reduce opportunisnt. Consider the following 
rnatrix: 
The framework includes two dimensions by which access to traded goods arc obtained. 
The first dimension expresses whether access to an input/output is on a spot or a long-term 
continuous basis; this line of analysis is consistent with transaction-cost theory. The second 
dimension decides whether access to the goods may be shared without destroying economic rents. 
Deciding wh:tt forth of countertrade to use fi~r entering up on an international transaction is
more complex than the usually proposed decision between firm or market. Barter contracts 
reached under these circumstances are called spot-market contracts, because they govern goods 
or services that arc to be xchanged "'on tile spot". For more complex transactions thai extend 
*ilennart ( I tF)()) distinguishc~, mctht~Jx of  organization (price sy~,lem vs. hierarchy ) from instiluti*mal choice. Thus, even 
when a Ix~lar institutional form is used. a mix of  organizational methods will often hc observed. A market transaction 
will predominantly rely on the price system, but may have hierarchical features O.e. bchavioural controls) as well. 
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over time a relational tbrm of contracting, which does not attempt he impossible task of 
exclusive contracting but ~ttles instead for an agreement that frames the relationship, other CT 
forms may be more suitable. Again, continuous access to an asset will be sought where 
opportunism appears likely to arise: ownership of a productive asset (internalization) or long- 
term production contracts (buy-back, counterpurehase, etc.) necessarily provides continuous 
access. 
However, there is another important dimension to consider: whether the access to the traded 
asset is exclusive or may be shared. If the spot versus continuous access decision reflects a min- 
imization of transaction costs, then the shared/exclusive access decision is driven by the desire 
to preserve imperfect competition. This matrix is thus perhaps more "eclectic" than the more 
purely transaction-cost explanations (Atik, 1993). 
A firm demands exclusive access to those assets which generate competitive advantages: 
proprietary technologies are the prime examples of such assets.* Other non-strategic assets may 
be profitably shared without dissipating rents. Certain goods, however, are best exploited through 
joint access, where by a limited number of firms share their use but jointly withhold use from all 
other market participants.t 
A long-term countertrade contract is thus on the same basis us ownership, providing 
continuous access to an asset, just as both ownership and long-term contracts suppress theneed 
to bargain over a longer period. On the other hand, barter and barter-type methods, for instance, 
arise because what appears to be shared use is in fact a spot transaction, with simultaneous 
exclusive access to the assets for the companies involved. Trade arrangements implying 
reciprocity can also be used to equalize the exposure of the parties. Other countertrade forms 
(buy-back. counterpurchase, etc.) represent particular trading arrangements. They occur when 
(i) access to an asset is to be continuous ; when (ii) shared access is more efficient han exclusive 
access; but when (iii) countertrade is preferred to the market mechanism. 
6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
One of the most important developments in international trade over the last two decades has 
been the increase and widespread use of barter-like practices, usually known under the generic 
name of countertrade. According to economic theory, if money exists as a means of exchange, 
then given the superiority of money-mediated transactions, barter would be irrational. 
Competing theories arise, however, when it comes to explaining reciprocal trade under both 
perfect and imperfect competition. Several authors have attempted to explain the presence and 
increasing prevalence of these complex ftwms of international transactions, using the standard 
ttmls of economic analysis. They show that in many circumstances countertrade is a rational 
response to transaction costs, information asymmetries, moral hazard/agency problems and other 
market imperfections, imply representing a substitute for other more standard forms of market 
trade or internalization aimed at reducing transaction costs under the conditions outlined. 
*As Dunning (1988) i~)ints out. the ov,'ncr~hip of  an asset is not irrelevant to its value. This makes an explicit link 
between ownership and kx:ational advantage. 
tShared use, it seems, can minimize transaction costs in certain circumstances, while simultaneously conversing the eco- 
nomic rents which these specific productive assets generate (Kogut. 1988. pp. 319-320). 
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In this article we have looked at economic ountertrade arrangements from a comparative 
institutional point of view, whereby cutting down transaction costs is een as the key feature of 
this form of strategic trading. We argue that countertrade is not novel: nor is it a mixed case. 
Rather, it is a distinct ype of institutional arrangement. Consequently in the organizational con- 
tinuum proposed by Williamson it is possible to construct and use a third (hybrid) institutional 
form which is congruent with transaction-cost theory. 
Hence, what distinguishes these complex forms of trading arrangements is the kind of trans- 
action effected (reciprocal trade), and the reason why they can minimize transaction costs more 
than internalization and market contracting. Each viable form of governance - - market, hybrid 
(countertrade), hierarchy m is defined by a series of attributes that bear a supporting relation- 
ship. 
This line of thought suggests that barter and barter-like trading agreements will be useful in 
situations where, due to asymmetric nformation, high transaction costs would otherwise prevent 
international trade from taking place. Other forms of countertrade such as buy-back, compensa- 
tion and counterpurchase on the other hand will be used to avoid restrictions on FDI by host 
countries. In this context wo of the most common forms of countertrade, compensation and 
counterpurchase, can be explained as attempts to build up reciprocity in order to reduce trans- 
action costs in the international marketplace for intermediate products, technology and distribu- 
tion services. Reciprocity can also be used to equalize the exposure of the parties in the case of 
buy-back agreements. 
Due to incomplete contracting or the absence of law enforcement, international trade imposes 
the great risk of opportunistic behaviour on the part of trading partners. Countertradc is supposed 
to solve the moral-hazard problem by introducing a "hostage", which would be forfeit - -  at any 
rate partly - -  if either party cheats during the first transaction. For this construction to work the 
hostage has to be sufficiently valuable compared with the possible benefits of cheating. 
In order to explain agreements in terms of stable strategies we also developed the concept of 
organizational flexibility, based on the activation of learning activities between the countertrade 
partners ~ something which the transaction-cost explanation htiled to consider. The choice of 
trading h~rm is thus a response related to the value of the dynamic elements ofcountcrtrade agree- 
ments as a means of learning and to increase future freedom of choice in unpredictable or 
changing environments. Countertrade will then be regarded as a routine process of creating 
complex agreements which constitute an institutional an institutional trading form. 
Barter and barter-type transactions can be explained in a framework where by access to the 
traded goods is on a spot but also an exclusive basis ~ a species of mutually exclusive spot 
contract in which no money is used. Other countertrade h~rms can be explained instead in that 
access to an input-output is continuous but can be shared without destroying economic rents. 
Nevertbelcss, although "'Considerable progress has been made in the last two years in devel- 
oping a theory of institutional choice based on the minimization of organizing costs" (Hennart, 
1994. p. 193), we do not claim to have presented a general theory of countertrade. Rather, we argue 
that some countertrade forms may often a superior trading structure for exploiting special situa- 
tions, where (i) the prospect of market failure means that spot contracting is unreliable; where (ii) 
access to assets can be viably shared without general diffusion; but where (iii) greater attention 
must be paid to preserving economic rents derived from the benefits of organizational flexibility. 
We therefore conclude that under certain circumstances ~ such as asymmetric nformation, 
host country restrictions on foreign investment, a rapidly changing environment ~ barter-like 
agreements and other forms of countertrade can represent a form of that minimizes transaction 
costs while also conserving the economic rents generated by these specific arrangements. 
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